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The threats against the Bluetooth wireless industrial networks are caused by a logical design flaw, an implementation flaw or a fundamental weakness; so an attacker can pose a threat to damage the network. This work explores the threats against the Bluetooth industrial networks, when a built-in security mechanism is enabled or not. It puts an exclusive focus on attacker´s capabilities equipped with protocol analyzer to get the required information for hop sequence synchronization to eavesdrop the Bluetooth communication; with capturing or without capturing the FHS packet, and also the analysis & development of various software defined radio applications using a MATLAB/Simulink and USRP2. This work also presents a complete SDR based prototype solution to get the master device address and its clock value; by intercepting and demodulating the FHS packet exchanged during the inquiry or the page procedure, furthermore without capturing the FHS packet just listing for a short time on a fixed RF frequency out of the 79 Bluetooth channels. The prototype system is build and interfaced with an USRP mother board and RFX2400 daughter board using the GNU radio framework.

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Author is a scientific assistant at Institute Industrial IT, Lemgo-Germany. He earned his MS from Ostwestfalen Lippe University of Applied Sciences, Germany and BS from Bahauddin Zakariya University, Pakistan. His research interests are in the area of security for wireless & industrial ethernet and cognitive & software defined radio applications.

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