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This book argues that experience gives us the data that is necessary to obtain and predict phenomena. It examines how a specific kind of data must have a particular way in which it can be obtained. Phenomena in the micro-world are subject to statistical rules, and there is no other way of obtaining data about phenomena than from experience. If facts can be obtained through rules of statistics, which it is assumed they can, this means we cannot obtain facts otherwise and cannot predict them otherwise. And if facts can be predicted in a definite way, in the macro-world, then it is implied that facts´ appearance,as observed through experience, is definite and should be determined. This text explains that we cannot invent or discover a unique method of cognition, a particular logic of science for the facts of experience and use it in all cases for all data that we could ever obtain. Instead, we just follow experience in its ways of discovering data. The methods we have to apply to obtain empirical facts should explicitly correspond to and influence our general decision-making.

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Alexander Mitjashin has worked as a Lecturer at St. Petersburg University. He is also the author of The World and Language: The Ontology for Natural Language (Lanham: University Press of America, 2006), Liberalism and Skepticism (Newcastle: C.S.P, 2007), and Physics and Metaphysics (Newcastle: C.S.P, 2011).

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