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This book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can be analysed from an economic perspective. Evaluate the welfare impacts, analyses the effects and the desirability of different breach remedies and examines the optimal incentive structure of party-designed liquidated damages under the different dimensions of informational asymmetry. Overall the book aims to contribute to the legal debate over the adoption of the specific breach remedies when the breach victim´s expectation interest is difficult to assess, and to the debate over courts´ reluctance to implement large penalties in the event of breach of contracts.

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1. Introduction
2. Basics of Economic Theory of Contract

3. Economics of Damage Remedies I: Unilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry

4. Economics of Damage Remedies II: Bilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry

5. Economics of Damage Remedies III: Incentives Under Expectation Damage With One-Sided Private Information -A Mechanism Design Approach

6. Economics of Damage Remedies IV: Incomplete Contracts, Bilateral Reliance, Two-Sided Asymmetric Information

7. Concluding Notes

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Sugata Bag is Assistant Professor of Economics at the Delhi School of Economics, India. After earning his B.Sc. (Honours) Economics from Calcutta University , Professor Bag completed Masters and Doctoral work in Economics at Jawaharlal Nehru University. His research interest lies in the following domain- Law and Economics, Development Economics, Contract Theory, Applied Econometrics.

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