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Following P.F. Strawson´s reading of Kant, the majority of the literature on transcendental arguments seeks to divorce such arguments from their original Kantian context. This essay is concerned with Mark Sacks´s recent defence of transcendental arguments, which takes a different approach. Firstly, the interpretive dimension is established via reflections on the motivations for a purely conceptual approach to the issues as framed within analytic philosophy. These motivations are criticised from a standpoint within which Kant´s theory of the pure form of intuition of space is taken to provide a structural form for our experience. Following this interpretive background, as well as an analysis of some major themes in the literature, a reconstruction of Sacks´s version of transcendental proof is given. Extensions and modifications of his approach are recommended; it is proposed that certain difficulties encountered by Kant´s transcendentally-ideal approach can be overcome with Hegelian solutions.

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Byron Clugston is currently a PhD candidate at The University of Sydney, under Paul Redding. His research interests include German idealism, phenomenology and various issues in the philosophy of mind and language.

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