---

Nuclear technology in all countries of the world is subject to controls from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent its misuse for military purposes. Recently these controls (or "safeguards") have come under criticism for lack of effectiveness, and the IAEA has now elaborated a strengthened safeguards system reaching deep into the domains of national sovereignty. Problems and prospects of the new system are discussed in this book by a team of German and international scholars, practitioners and officials.

---

E. Häckel, G. Stein: Introduction.- Background: W. Fischer: Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards: From INFCIRC/153 to INFCIRC/540 and beyond.- R. Loosch: From ´Programme 93+2´ to Model Protocol INFCIRC/540: Negotiating for a Mulitlateral Agreement in the International Atomic Enery Agency.- Implications: W. Sandtner: The Structure and Content of Model Protocol INFCIRC/540.- R. Gerstler, W.-D. Lauppe, G. Stein: Aspects of Integrating INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/540.- B. Pellaud: The Strengthened Safeguards System: Objectives, Challenges and Expectations.- R. Weh: The Point of View of German Facility Operators.- W. Gmelin: Implications for Nuclear Safeguards in the EU Countries.- H. Remagen, B. Richter: Implications for Research and Development in Safeguards Technology.- H. Blankenstein: The New Safeguards System in the Context of International Non-Proliferation Policy.- Outlook: E. Häckel: Implementing Safeguards in Weak and Failed States.- A. Schaper: Implementing Safeguards in Countries Under Suspicion.- J. Prawitz: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Their Added Value in a Strengthened International Safeguards System.- H. Müller: The Uses and Limits of International Safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States.- W. Ungerer: Towards a Comprehensive Nuclear Policy for the European Union.- Annexes: Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540).

---