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This book shows that the contributions of Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann to a material ethics of value are complementary: supplementing the work of one with that of the other, the editors obtain a comprehensive and defensible axiological and moral theory.

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Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann developed ethics upon a phenomenological basis. This volume demonstrates that their contributions to a material ethics of value are complementary: by supplementing the work of one with that of the other, we obtain a comprehensive and defensible axiological and moral theory. By "phenomenology," we refer to an intuitive procedure that attempts to describe thematically the insights into essences, or the meaning-elements of judgments, that underlie and make possible our conscious awareness of a world and the evaluative judgments we make of the objects and persons we encounter in the world.

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Chapter One: The Idea of a Material Value-Ethics.

a. Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann.

b. The difficulties facing efforts at a synthesis of Scheler and Hartmann´s moral theories.

c. The Character of material value-ethics.

d. The aims of material value-ethics.

e. Passing beyond Kant.

f. Prospects of material value-ethics.

Chapter Two: The Phenomenology of Value.

a. Nature and aims of phenomenology.

b. Scheler´s distinctive phenomenological procedure.

c. Husserl´s theory of value.

d. Scheler´s phenomenology of values.
e. The stratification of the emotional life.

f. The order of values.

g. Values and norms.

Chapter Three: The Orientation of Human Beings toward Value.

a. The aspiration to systematic philosophy.

b. Anthropological foundations of the human openness to values.

c. Human freedom.

d. Conclusions.

Chapter Four: Values and Moral Values.

c. Relational oppositions among values.

d. Qualitative and quantitative oppositions.

d. Values that condition contents.

e. Goods as values.

e. Laws that condition content.

Chapter Five: Action Theory and the Problem of Motivation.

a. The problem of action.

b. Hartmann´s action theory.

c. Scheler´s critique of Kant´s concept of action.

d. The general structure of action.

e. The essential phenomenology of action.

f. Consequences for moral judgment.

g. Moral motivation.

Chapter Six: Goodness and Moral Obligation.

a. Values and norms.

b. The negativity of obligation.

c. The phenomenology of obligation.

d. Moral authority and education.

e. The contribution of Dietrich von Hildebrand to the problem of obligation.

f. Love and obligation.

g. The relativity and universality of obligation.

h. Obligation in Husserl.

i. The structure and limits of moral autonomy in Scheler.

Chapter Seven: The Concept of Virtue and Its Foundations.

a. The conflict of reason and emotion in Scheler.

b. The essential phenomenology of virtue.

c. Von Hildebrand on virtue.

d. Virtue theory in Husserl.

e. Hartmann: The moral context of virtue.

Chapter Eight: Virtue Ethics.

a. The Platonic virtues.

b. The Aristotelian virtues.

d. The Christian virtues.

e. Modernity: The third order of values.

f. The structure of the realm of value.

Chapter Nine: The Phenomenology of the Person.

a. Personhood in Scheler.

b. Hartmann´s critique of Scheler´s concept of the person.

Chapter Ten: Ethical Personalism.

a. Hartmann´s ethical personalism.

b. Scheler´s ethical personalism.

c. Scheler on the person in a moral setting.

d. The intimate person and personal love.

e. Models and leaders.

f. Material value-ethics and the good life.

g. The problem of the unity of the table of values revisited.

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