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A Na‹ve Realist Theory of Colour defends the view that colours are mind-independent properties of things in the environment. Keith Allen argues that a na‹ve realist theory of colour best explains how colours appear to perceiving subjects, and that this view is not undermined by our modern scientific understanding of the world.

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A Na‹ve Realist Theory of Colour defends the view that colours are mind-independent properties of things in the environment, that are distinct from properties identified by the physical sciences. This view stands in contrast to the long-standing and wide-spread view amongst philosophers and scientists that colours don´t really exist - or at any rate, that if they do exist, then they are radically different from the way that they appear. It is argued
that a na‹ve realist theory of colour best explains how colours appear to perceiving subjects, and that this view is not undermined either by reflecting on variations in colour perception between perceivers and across perceptual conditions, or by our modern scientific understanding of the world. A Na‹ve Realist
Theory of Colour also illustrates how our understanding of what colours are has far-reaching implications for wider questions about the nature of perceptual experience, the relationship between mind and world, the problem of consciousness, the apparent tension between common sense and scientific representations of the world, and even the very nature and possibility of philosophical inquiry.

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The book is rich in numerous original and subtle arguments. ... It is an invaluable contribution to the literature on color and perception and highly recommended to anyone who is interested in the relation between mind and world. Hagit Benbaji, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

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Keith Allen is Senior Lecturer at the Univeristy of York. He was previously a Jacbosen Research Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, London, and is interested in colour, the philosophy of perception, early modern philosophy, and phenomenology.

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